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REVOKING PROBATION, PAROLE OR PARDON
WITHOUT A HEARING
Henry Weihofen'
In about half the states, whenever the
pardon or parole authorities are satis-
fied that a prisoner released on parole
or conditional pardon has violated the
terms of his release, he is summarily
returned to prison without being given
any hearing or chance to disprove the
alleged violation.2 In at least five states,
the same summary procedure is used
also in revoking probation.3 In a Mis-
souri case, for example, a prisoner had
been given a "sick parole," to allow him
to obtain treatment for tuberculosis.
Later, the Governor revoked this parole
because the parole board "had con-
cluded" that the parolee did not have
tuberculosis. He was thereupon sent
back to prison without being afforded
an opportunity to present medical testi-
mony to show, if he could, that he
actually was tubercular.'
Such summary revocation of condi-
tional release (the term we shall use in
this article to cover parole, conditional
pardon and probation) has been criti-
cized from the standpoint of sound penal
administration, but until lately, its con-
stitutionality has hardly been doubted.
I Associate professor of law, University of
Colorado School of Law; Special Assistant to
the Attorney General (1937-8) and Editor of
VoL MI, "Pardon," of The Attorney General's
Survey of Release Procedures (1939); presently
principal attorney, Board of Legal Examiners.
2 This is the practice in Alabama, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee,
Recently, however, a federal case has
held that such revocation without a
hearing violates due process of law.
The case arose in Kentucky. The Gov-
ernor had granted a conditional pardon
which provided that if the prisoner
failed to fulfill its conditions he might
"by executive order . . .be re-arrested
and re-confined ... ." The pardon was
revoked without notice or hearing. The
convict thereupon instituted habeas
corpus proceedings for release, claiming
that such summary revocation violated
due process. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals construed the pardon to reserve
power to revoke without a hearing, and
held that the prisoner by accepting it
had assented to its terms.5 The convict
then filed a similar petition in the federal
district court, which held that if it were
free to construe the pardon for itself, it
would find that the pardon did not re-
serve a right to revoke without notice
and. hearing, but that it considered it-
self bound by the contrary construc-
tion adopted by the state court, and
that the writ should for that reason
be refused.6 Upon appeal, the Circuit
South Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin and
Wyoming. Attorney General's Survey of Re-
lease Procedures, VoL IV, "Parole," p. 245 (1939).
3 California, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota and
Missouri. Id., Vol. 11, "Probation," p. 329.
4 Lime v. Blagg, 345 Mo. 1, 131 S. W. (2d) 583
(1939).
5 Comm. ex. rel. Meredith v. Hall, 277 Ky. 612,
126 S. W. (2d) -1056 (1939).




Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
agreed that the state court's interpre-
tation of the pardon was conclusive,
but held that, so interpreted, it was
unconstitutional; reservation of power
to revoke without giving the convict
a chance to deny the charges of vio-
lation deprives him of due process of
law.'
Prior cases had in general agreed in
making the following distinction: where
the statute under which the releasing
authority acted specifically authorized
Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F. (2d) 982 (C. C.
A. 6th 1941).
8 Conditional pardon cases so holding: Hen-
derson v. State. 55 Fla. 36, 46 So. 151 (1908);
Muckle v. Clarke, 191 Ga. 202, 12 S. E. (2d) 339
(1940); Arthur v. Craig, 48 Iowa 264, 30 Am. Rep.
395 (1878); State ex rel. Davis v. Hunter, 124
Iowa 569, 100 N. W. 510, 104 Am. St. Rep. 361
(1904); Lime v. Blagg, 345 Mo. 1, 131 S. W. (2d)
583 (1939); Ex parte Webb, 322 Mo. 859, 30 S. W.
(2d) 612 (1929); State v. Yates, 183 N. C. 753,
111 S. E. 337 (1922); Ex parte Smith, 65 Okla. Cr.
393, 87 P. (2d) 1106 (1939); Ex parte Houghton.
49 Ore. 232, 89 Pac. 801, 9 L. R. A. (n. s.) 737, 13
Ann. Cas. 1101 (1907); State ex rel. Bedford v.
McCorkle, 163 Tenn. 101, 40 S. W. (2d) 1015
(1931); Ex parte Davenport, 110 Tex. Cr. 326.
7 S. W. (2d) 589 (1927); In re Convicts, 73 Vt.
414, 51 Atl. 10, 56 L. R. A. 658 (1901); Spencer v.
Kees, 47 Wash. 276, 91 Pac. 963 (1907); State ex
rel. Rowe v. Connors, 166 Tenn. 393, 61 S. W.
(2d) 471 (1933). See also Koslowsky v. Judge,
238 Mass. 532, 131 N. E. 188 (1921).
Parole cases: Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26
So. 146 (1898); Woodward v. Murdock, 124 Ind.
439, 24 N. E. 1047 (1890); State v. Crepeau, 150
Minn. 80, 184 N. W. 567 (1921); Ex parte Vigil,
24 N. M. 640. 175 Pac. 713 (1918); Ex parte Foster.
61 P. (2d) 37 (Okla., 1936); Ex parte Woodward,
58 Okla. Cr. 333, 53 P. (2d) 288 (1935); Ex parte
Butler. 40 Okla. Cr. 434, 269 Pac. 786 (1928); Ex
parte Collins, 32 Okla. Cr. 6. 239 Pac. 693 (1925);
Ex parte Horine, 11 Okla. Cr. 517, 148 Pac. 825
(1915).
Probation cases: People v. O'Donnell, 37 Cal.
App. 192. 174 Pac. 102 (1918); People v. Sanders,
64 Cal. App. 1. 220 Pac. 24 (1923); People v.
Blankenship. 16 Cal. App. (2d) 606, 61 P. (2d)
352 (1936); In re Young. 121 Cal. App. 711. 10
P. (2d) 154 (1932): Pagano v. Bechly. 211 Iowa
1294, 323 N. W. 798 (1930); Bowers v. Wilson, 143
Kan. 732, 56 P. (2d) 1212 (1936); In re Patterson.
94 Kan. 439. 146 Pac. 1009 (1915); State v.
Chandler, 158 Minn. 447,- 197 N. W. 847 (1924);
summary revocation, or where the re-
lease itself contained as one of its con-
ditions a provision that it might be sum-
marily revoked, summary revocation is
legal;8 but where neither the statute nor
the instrument itself reserved such a
right to revoke without a hearing, a
judicial trial is necessary. 9 Some courts,
like the Kentucky Court of Appeals,
have been amazingly able to find reser-
vations of power to revoke without a
hearing.10 Fleenor v. Hammond is the
first case to hold that even when pro-
vided for by the terms of the pardon,
State ex rel. Jenks v. Municipal Court, 197 Minn.
141, 266 N. W. 433 (1936).
9 State v. Home, 52 Fla. 125, 42 So. 388, 7 L. R.
A. (n. s.) 719 (1906); rehearing denied, 52 Fla.
143, 42 So. 714 (1907); Alvarez v. State, 50 Fla.
24, 39 So. 481, 111 Am. St. Rep. 102, 7 Ann. Cas.
88 (1905); Smith v. Veach, 165 Ga. 190, 140 S. E.
356 (1927); Plunckett v. Miller, 161 Ga. 466, 131
S. E. 170 (1925); State ex rel. O'Connor v. Wolfer,
53 Minn. 135, 54 N. W. 1065, 19 L. R. A. 783, 39
Am. St. Rep. 582, 9 Am. Cr. Rep. 487 (1893);
Ex parte Strauss, 320 Mo. 349, 7 S. W. (2d) 1000
(1928). And see People v. Potter, 1 Park. Cr. 47
(N. Y., 1846); People v. Burns, 77 Hun 92, 28
N. Y. Supp. 300 (1894); State v. Barnes, 32 S. C.
14, 10 S. E. 611, 6 L. R. A. 743, 17 Am. Dec. 557
(1847)..
10 In Muckle v. Clarke, 191 Ga. 202, 12 S. E.
(2d) 339 (1940), the pardon merely provided that
it should be "revocable at the pleasure of the
Governor upon violation of any of the laws,"
etc. The court held that this language "would
admit of no reasonable interpretation other than
that the Governor reserved the power to revoke
the pardon without notice or hearing on viola-
tion of its terms." (Italics added.) In Lime v.
Blagg, 345 Mo. 1, 131 S. W. (2d) 583 (1939), a
prisoner was given a "sick parole," to receive
treatment for tuberculosis, which provided that
he might be recommitted upon his restoration
to health. The governor later revoked the pa-
role because the parole board "had concluded"
that the prisoner did not have tuberculosis. No
hearing was had. The court apparently assumed
that the provision for revocation upon restora-
tion to health was to be interpreted to give the
governor the power to revoke on this ground
without a hearing.
These cases seem wrong; they violate the
generally accepted rule that "ambiguities are to
be resolved in favor of the recipient of the act
of grace, and limitations are to be strictly con-
strued." In re Charles and Howard, 115 Kan.
323, 222 Pac. 606 (1924); accord! Osborn v. United
States, 91 U. S. 474 (1875).
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revocation without notice and hearing
is unconstitutional.'"
It is submitted that the case is right,
and that the distinction made in other
cases, mentioned above, is wrong on
both counts: It should not be deemed
constitutional to deprive a parolee or
person released on probation or condi-
tional pardon of his freedom without a
hearing, even though such summary re-
vocation is specifically provided for. On
the other hand, due process does not re-
quire a judicial hearing; an informal
hearing before the governor or board
should be sufficient.
It may be argued that a person at
liberty on conditional release should
be subject to re-commitment without
further trial because he has already had
his hearing in his criminal trial. Having
been convicted and sentenced, he could
legally have been required to serve his
full sentence without further process.
If the state, instead, releases him on
certain conditions before expiration of
the full sentence, that is a matter of
grace, and if the possibility of summary
revocation is one of these conditions, the
prisoner has no right to complain. He
is not being deprived of any right, but
x IThe Michigan court in 1886 had held a
statute unconstitutional insofar as it authorized
the warden or other prison official to arrest and
remand to prison without a warrant or em-
powered a trial in the circuit court without a
preliminary examination before a magistrate.
People v. Moore, 62 Mich. 496, 29 N. W. 80 (1886).
This actually goes further than Fleenor v. Ham-
mond, supra, because the Michigan statute gave
the prisoner a hearing; but the fact that it did
not give him as full protection as other crim-
inals accused of crime was held fatal. "If a
condition is imposed," the court said, "that he
shall not do anything or things, this does not
hamper or abridge his rights or liberties until
the condition is broken; and in order to remand
and confine him in prison again, the fact of the
violation of such condition must be established
by the due administration of the law, as in
533
merely of a gratuity which the state
need not have conferred to begin with. 2
This argument is well answered by
the Circuit Court of Appeals in Flee-
nor v. Hammond:
"We may grant at once that the giving
of a pardon is an act of grace; that to
it the Governor may attach conditions;
that if any condition is broken the Gov-
ernor may revoke and that his judg-
ment as to the breach is final and con-
clusive upon the courts. It does not
follow, however, from the reservation
of a right to revoke, that it may be ex-
ercised arbitrarily or upon whim, ca-
price, or rumor. Upon the granting of
a pardon, albeit conditionally, the con-
vict was entitled to his liberty and pos-
sessed of a right which could be for-
feited only by reason of a breach of the
conditions of the grant. In the present
case it carried with it ultimate restora-
tion of full civil rights. To hold that
such forfeiture may be imposed without
giving the grantee an opportunity to be
heard, does violence to what are said
to be 'immutable principles of justice,
which inhere in the very idea of free
government, which no member of the
Union can disregard'."'"
The court could have gone further.
It was not necessary to "grant at once"
that pardon is an act of grace. If pardon
was once the exercise of mere grace or
favor by a personal monarch, that day
other cases of the violation of the penal statutes."
Id. at 501, 29 N. W. at 82. The court felt certain
that no "courts or executives will ever be in-
vested in our State with the power of remand-
ing pardoned convicts back to prison for the
alleged violation of the conditions of their par-
don, without an arrest by due process of law,
and a fair trial, with the same opportunities for
defense that are afforded every other citizen
when accused of crime." Id. at 505, 29 N. W.
at 84.
12This reasoning was followed by the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals in Comm. ex rel. Mere-
dith v. Hall, 277 Ky. 612, 126 S. W. (2d) 1056
(1939). See also Arthur v. Craig, 48 Iowa 264.
268 (1878); Ex parte Horine, 11 Okla. Cr. 517,
523, 148 Pac. 825, 827 (1915).
13 116 F. (2d) 982, 986 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941).
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is past. Restricted to its proper sphere,
pardon might correctly be referred to
as an act of grace, but conditional par-
don is today extensively used as a regu-
lar release procedure, to serve the pur-
pose of parole. As such, it is part and
parcel of our system of criminal admin-
istration, and in that administration,
the state is required to act in accordance
with due process.
The courts themselves recognize that
it is not true that the power of imposing
conditions is wholly unrestricted. In
pardon cases, the rule is usually stated
that the governor or other pardoning
authority may grant pardons on any
conditions "not illegal, immoral, or in-
capable of performance." A condition
that a pardon may be revoked on order
of the probation officer has been held
void. 14 It would seem that a condition
permitting revocation without notice
and hearing should be declared an il-
legal condition.
It may be suggested that the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions should
apply here. It is established doctrine
"that a regulation that would violate a
given provision of the federal consti-
tution if directly imposed will violate
that same provision if sought to be im-
posed as a condition to the grant of a
privilege which the state is free to grant
or withhold."' 5
14 In re McKinney, 33 Del. 434, 138 Aft. 649
(1927). A condition that the convict be put to
work for three years in such manner as the di-
rectors of public buildings might direct has also
been held void. Comm. v. Fowler, 4 Call. 35
(Va. 1785). And in State ex rel. Davis v. Hunter,
124 Iowa 569, 100 N. W. 510 (1904), a conditional
release providing that on violation, the prisoner
was to be returned to prison and was to forfeit
his statutory good time allowance, was held
bad, the court saying that while the governor
could attach any conditions not illegal, immoral
or impossible, he could not require forfeiture of
this statutory privilege. C
Where the statute or the parole or
pardon itself provides as one of the
conditions of release that the prisoner's
liberty may be summarily revoked
without a hearing, a further argument
is almost always added: that the de-
fendant voluntarily accepted the re-
lease on the conditions laid down, and
so cannot now be heard to complain.
This argument is based upon the oft-
repeated but nevertheless wholly ab-
surd proposition that a prisoner has a
right to accept or reject such a condi-
tional release. Does any sensible man
-on the bench or off- really believe
that a convicted criminal has a right to
reject probation, pardon, or parole, and
insist on keeping his cell or being
hanged, even though the proper authori-
ties have ordered him discharged?
It seems amazing, but scores of ju-
dicial opinions have solemnly stated
that he does."6 It is true that these state-
ments are almost all mere obiter dicta."
All can be traced back to a grandfather-
dictum of that master of dictum, Chief
Justice John Marshall. In 1833, he
stated that "a pardon is a deed, to the
validity- of which delivery is essential,
and delivery is not complete without
acceptance," and a pardon "may then be
rejected by the person to whom it is
tendered.""
15 Rottschaefer, Handbook of American Con-
stitutional Law (1939) p. 557.
16 See cases collected in 52 A. L. R. 835.
17 See ex parte Powell, 73 Ala. 517 (1883);
Grubb v. Bullock, 44 Ga. 379 (1871); Lee v.
Murphy, 22 Grat. (Va.) 798, 12 Am. Rep. 563
(1872). In other cases where the statement oc-
curs, the decision actually turned on points of
pleading, as in Michael v. State, 40 Ala. 361
(1867), or on statutes, as in Carpenter v. Lord,
88 Ore. 127, 171 Pac. 577 (1918).
is Urited States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 150
1833).
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This statement was wholly unneces-
sary to the decision of the case, and ap-
parently rested on a misconception of
early English decisions. In England, the
king's pardon, being a private act of
grace, was not the subject of judicial
notice.'0 Under old English rules of
pleading, it was said that a plea of not
guilty waived the pardon, and it could
not thereafter be availed of.20 Only in
this sense could a pardon be "rejected"
in England, but Marshall skipped lightly
from this rule of pleading to a substan-
tive rule that acceptance was necessary.
This was not the law of England. On the
contrary, it had been held that where a
pardon was properly brought to the
attention of the court, whether by plead-
ing or by judicial notice as in the case
of a legislative pardon, the convict could
not waive it.21 This is also the prevailing
view of most European countries.
2 2
Nevertheless, Marshall's dictum has
been solemnly repeated by federal and
state courts in scores of cases, and has
even been extended to parole as well
as pardon, because "parole is merely d
kind of conditional pardon,"-an error
piled on an error.23 Even in probation
cases, the courts not infrequently talk
about the prisoner's having accepted
i 4 i3l. Comm. 402.
21 I have reviewed the English law on this
point in Attorney General's Survey of Release
Procedures, Vol. III, "Pardons," p. 189.
21 2 Hawkins, 1 P. C., ch. 37, §58.
" -'Feuerbach, Peinlichen Rechts (1847 ed.) p.
123; Garraud, Traite theorique et partique de
droit penal francais (1914) p. 643.
2 Parole is not merely a form of conditional
pardon. See Weihofen, "Consolidation of Pardon
and Parole: A Wrong Approach," 30 Jour. Crim.
Law and Crimin. 534 (1940).
2 See Pagano v. Bechly. 211 Iowa 1294. 232
N. W. 798 (1930); In re Patterson, 94 Kan. 439,
146 Pac. 1009 (1915); State v. Collins, 225 Mo. 633,
125 S. W. 465 (1910). See also Ex parte Young.
121 Cal. App. 711, 10 P. (2d) 154 (1932), where
such release,2 4 though it is difficult to
see how the notion can be rationalized
here: certainly probation is not "a kind
of conditional pardon.!'
It is true that the dictum has remained
almost entirely pure dictum. Direct de-
cisions on the point are rare, perhaps
because prisoners have rarely preferred
to be hanged or imprisoned rather than
to accept conditional release. But in
1939 a California prisoner did insist on
his alleged right not to be paroled (for
the very good reason that the parole
was to be to the custody of the Texas
authorities who wanted him for an es-
cape on a 30 year sentence); and the
California court actually held that he
had a right to retain his California
cell!
25
This decision opens new vistas of
prison privileges in California. Perhaps
we can say that it gives prisoners a
vested right to their maximum punish-
ment. Can a prisoner refuse to work
on the prison farm, by refusing to "ac-
cept" that sort of limited freedom? Can
he "reject" the liberty of using the exer-
cise yard?
If it seems unfair to condemn the
California court for actually applying a
proposition to which so many other
defendant had "waived any informality of pro-
cedure by failing to object thereto, when he was
taken before the court for the purpose of re-
voking his probation," though the court also
said that he was not entitled to a trial or formal
hearing on revocation; and People v. Sanders,
64 Cal. App. 1, 220 Pac. 24 (1923), where, al-
though defendant complained that he had had
no notice of revocation, he had in fact had a
hearing at which he appeared and was repre-
sented by counsel. In the only other case sus-
taining revocation of probation without notice
and hearing, the court merely cited the statute
providing for summary revocation, without
troubling to discuss its constitutionality. State
v. Chandler, 158 Minn. 447, 197 N. W. 847 (1924).
25 Ex parte Peterson, 14 Cal. 12d) 82, 92 P.
(2d) 890 (1939).
HENRY WEIHOFEN
courts had given lip service, it may be
pointed out that the fallacious dictum
which the California court swallows so
blindly had years before been exposed
and disowned by the very court which
gave it birth. In 1927 the United States
Supreme Court was confronted with a
case where a federal prisoner con-
demned to death had been given a com-
mutation by the President to life im-
prisonment. Sixteen years later, he sued
out a writ of habeas corpus alleging (1)
that the President had no power to
grant a commutation changing the na-
ture and character of the punishment,
and (2) that at all events such a com-
mutation was ineffective without his
consent. The United States Supreme
Court rejected both contentions. Mr.
Justice Holmes, writing the opinion of
the unanimous court, said:
"A pardon in our days is not a private
act of grace from an individual happen-
ing to possess power. It is a part of the
constitutional scheme. When granted it
is the determination of the ultimate
authority that the public welfare will
be better served by inflicting less than
what the judgment fixed. See Ex parte
Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 120, 121. Just as
the original punishment would be im-
posed without regard to the prisoner's
consent and in the teeth of his will,
whether he liked it or not, the public
welfare, not his consent, determines
what shall be done. So far as a pardon
legitimately cuts down a penalty, it af-
fects the judgment imposing it. No one
doubts that a reduction of the term of
an imprisonment or the amount of a fine
would limit the sentence effectively on
the one side and on the other would
leave the reduced term or fine valid and
2a. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U. S. 480, 71 L. ed.
1161, 47 Sup. Ct. 664 (1927). Accord: Ex parte
Denton, 101 P. (2d) 276 (Okla. Cr., 1940).
27 Ex parte Peterson, supra, n. 24; United
States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150, 8 L. ed. 640 (1833);
In re Prout, 12 Idaho 494, 86 Pac. 275, 5 L. R. A.
(n. s.) 1064 (1906); In re Williams, 149 N. C. 436,
63 S. E. 108 (1908).
to be enforced, and that the convict's
consent is not required:
"When we come to the commutation
of death to imprisonment for life it is
hard to see how consent has any more
to do with it than it has in the cases first
put. Supposing that Perovich did not
accept the change, he could not have got
himself hanged against the Executive
order. Supposing that he did accept, he
could not affect the judgment to be car-
ried out. The considerations that led to
the modification had nothing to do with
his will.... The opposite answer would
permit the President to decide that jus-
tice requires the diminution of a term
or a fine without consulting the convict,
but would deprive him of the power in
the most important cases and require
him to permit an execution which he had
decided ought not to take place unless
the change is agreed to by one who on
no sound principle ought to have any
voice in what the law should do for the




There is little to add to this statement.
One can only wish that courts would
read it before indulging in ill-considered
statements to the effect that pardon is an
act of grace, and that a prisoner has the
right to accept or reject.
It was argued by the California court
in the Peterson case and has been
argued by other courts, that a prisoner
must be conceded the right to reject a
conditional pardon because the condi-
tions may be more onerous than the
punishment fixed by the sentence. 7
But the guaranty against ex post facto
laws should be sufficient protection
against such an unlikely eventuality.
2'
Thus, the whole argument based on
the premise that "the prisoner accepted
28 It is realized that strictly, the ex post facto
provisions refer only to passing laws, and an
executive or administrative release may be held
not to constitute the passing of a law, just as it
has been held that a judicial decision cannot be
an ex post facto law. Ross v. Oregon, 227 U. S.
150, 57 L. ed. 458, 33 Sup. Ct. 220 (1913). But the
principle of nulla poena sine lege is so funda-
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the pardon with the condition attached,
and so cannot now complain," collapses.
He did not accept because he had no
privilege to reject. A conditional pardon
is not a contract between equals. It is
a sovereign act of the state acting
through its chief executive, operating
upon a subject. In a contract between
two parties dealing on an equal standing,
they may provide for any sort of condi-
tions they see fit, so long as they are not
illegal, immoral or impossible. But
when the sovereign state acts upon one
of its subjects, it is required to deal with
him in accordance with due process of
law. Under a conditional pardon, the
prisoner is released not by agreement,
but by order of the state alone; the con-
ditions upon which he is released and
under which he may be returned are
not agreed upon by mutual negotiation,
but are laid down by the state. It is true
that the prisoner is usually required to
sign an "agreement" to obey the con-
ditions, but this is not a contract, but
merely a means of bringing the condi-
tions home to him. He could be released
without such signature, and he could
not keep his cell by refusing to sign.
His assent is significant only in deter-
mining whether the state, in its abso-
lute discretion, would be wise in re-
mental to our system of law that a conditional
release more onerous than the original sentence
might well be held to violate substantive due
process.
29 State v. O'Neal, 147 Wash. 169, 265 Pac. 175
(1928). This was a probation case, but the state-
ment should be equally applicable to any other
kind of conditional release. The Idaho proba-
tion statute makes no provision for a hearing,
but the Idaho court has held that "common
justice would require that he be given a hear-
ing, which was not done in this case." In re
Peterson, 19 Idaho 433, 113 Pac. 729 (1911). Sem-
ble: People v. Hodges, 231 Mich. 656, 204 N. W.
801 (1925); People ex rel. Stumpf v. Craig, 79
Misc. 98, 140 N. Y. Supp. 652 (1913. In the latter
case, the court said: "To send a person to prison
leasing him or not. If he indicates that
he would not obey the conditions, it
would probably be unwise to release
him,,but it is absurd to say that the state
would be powerless to do so if it wished.
The majority of state courts already
agree, as we have seen, that where the
statute or the release does not spe-
cifically reserve the power of summary
revocation, such revocation without
giving the person an opportunity to be
heard "is to disregard a principle as old
as the law itself."29 The only argument
that can be raised for a different rule
where such power is reserved is the
argument that the prisoner "accepted"
the release with such a condition at-
tached. But if the notion that a prisoner
has any power to accept or reject re-
lease is exploded, there is no reason for
the distinction. Depriving a person so
released of his liberty3 upon a charge
which he is not allowed to disprove is
a violation of due process in every case.
Will the Supreme Court uphold the
Circuit Court of Appeals in this view?
The Supreme Court has in a general
way quoted with approval Daniel Web-
ster's classic definition of due process as
"a law which hears before it con-
denms,"30 and has said that the due
process clause requires "that state ac-
because he has violated some condition which
he insists he has not, and without specifying
what it is, and without giving him an oppor-
tunity to be apprised of the condition and its
violation which is claimed to have occurred, and
to be heard in his own behalf, violates elemen-
tary principles of criminal jurisprudence... "
Revocation of a conditional pardon where there
had been no violation of the conditions, merely
because later discovered evidence had led the
governor to delive that clemency was ill ad-
vised, has been held a violation of due process.
Ex parte Rice, 72 Tex. Cr. 587, 162 S. W. 891
(1913).
30Povell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 77 L. ed.
158, 84 L. ed. 527, 53 Sup. Ct. 55, 64 (1932).
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tion, whether through one agency or
another, shall be consistent with the
fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base ofiWl our
civil and political institutions. "" How-
ever, in a case where probation had
been revoked by a federal district judge
without a hearing, the Supreme Court
held that the federal probation act made
a hearing mandatory, in order that "he
shall have a chance to say his say be-
fore the word of his pursuers is re-
ceived to his undoing." But the court
specifically said that this decision rested
on the statute, and "we do not accept
the petitioner's contention that the
privilege has a basis in the Constitution,
apart from any statute. Probation or
suspension of sentence comes- as an act
of grace to one convicted of a crime, and
may be coupled with such conditions in





This is an ominously clear indication
that the court would not-agree with the
viewpoint of the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals-for obviously the same rationale,
based on the concept of probation as an
"act of grace" is equally applicable to
parole and conditional pardon. Of
course, the statement is dictum, and if
the court wishes to, it can dismiss it as
such. Perhaps it would do so, if the
error of the dictum is pointed out.
Four flagrant but persistent errors
underlie all the cases which uphold the
legality of revocation of conditional re-
leases without notice or hearing:
::1 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278. 80 L. ed.
68?. 56 Sup. Ct. 461. 465 (1936).
32 Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 492, 493 (1934).
s3 Supra, n. 25.
34 Supra, n. 22.
:, Supra, n. 23.
1,; Similarly, the South Carolina court has held
that where pardon is granted on condition that
1. The notion that pardon, parole or
probation are "acts of grace." A reading
of Judge Holmes' opinion in Biddle v.
Perovich:;:' should be sufficient to silence
this misconception-but it hasn't, even
in the United States Supreme Court.
2. That a pardon is a deed, to the
validity of which acceptance is neces-
* sary. (Has no one ever read Biddle v.
Perovich?)
3. That parole is "a kind of condi-
tional pardon" and so requires accept-
ance too."4
4. That probation involves accept-
ance also. The courts do not usually
argue that probation is "a kind of con-
ditional pardon," but the cases holding
that revocation without notice or hear-
ing is valid are invariably based on a
loose assumption that the probationer
"accepted" probation. 5
Knock out these false props, and it is
impossible to construct an argument
sustaining the constitutionality of arbi-
trary revocation of conditional releases.
It may be asked whether there is any
crying need for burdening the governor
or parole boards with the time-consum-
ing formality of a hearing in every case
of revocation. We may admit at once
that in many-perhaps most-cases, no
such need exists. Where the revocation
is on the ground of commission of a new
crime, and the prisoner has already
been convicted of that new crime, the
record of that conviction is pretty con-
clusive.:"; In states where such new
crime is practically the only ground on
the prisoner leave the state, no trial is neces-
sary, because the fact that the prisoner has
been rearrested in the state is sufficient proof
that the condition has been breached. State v.
Smith, 1 Bailey 283 (S. C. 1829). Cf. State ex
rel. O'Connor v. Wolfer, 53 Minn. 135, 54 N. W.
1065, 19 L. R. A. 783, 39 Am. St. Rep. 582, 9 Am.
Cr. Rep. 487 (1893).
PROBATION, PAROLE, PARDON
which a parole or conditional pardon is
ever revoked (e.g., Colorado and West
Virginia), there would be little need for
hearings. Nevertheless, where there is
room for question as to whether the
prisoner has in fact violated the terms
of the parole or not, the right to a hear-
ing should not be denied. Perhaps it
vould be sufficient to give the right to
such a hearing if the prisoner thinks he
has been unjustly returned to prison,
without going through the formality of
a hearing in every case. In any case, the
hearing certainly need not be a formal
judicial trial,/ but may be an informal
inquiry "so fitted in its range to the
needs of the occasion as to justify the
conclusion that discretion has not been
abused by the failure of the inquisitor
to carry the probe further."'
38
The arguments for granting hearings
in dubious cases, at least, have been well
stated in the report of the Attorney
General's Survey of Release Proced-
ures:
"A question naturally arises as to the
advisability of holding these hearings
which consume the time of men already
over-burdened with work. The answer
to this objection is threefold: In the
first place, the possibility exists that the
parole agent was over-hasty in his ac-
tion in returning the parolee as a vio-
lator. Parole agents are human, and it
is possible that friction between the
agent and parolee may have influenced
37 A number of cases, previously mentioned
(ante, note 8), have said that in the absence of
a provision for revocation by the releasing au-
thority, the revocation must be by a judicial
order. But this can be dismissed as mere dictum
in almost every case. Only the extreme case of
People v. Moore, supra, note 10, actually so
holds. In all the other cases mentioned above,
the governor had attempted to revoke the con-
the agent's judgment. In fairness to the
violator, this is a possibility which
should he investigated by some higher
authority. The hearing is of special im-
portance in those States in which the
sponsorship system of supervision exists,
since there have been numerous in-
stances in which sponsor-employers
'sweated' the parolees in their custody
unmercifully under threat of declaring
them parole violators on trumped up
charges.
"Another reason for holding a hearing
is that often the true psychology of the
parolee precedent to the commission of
the violation is revealed. The trend of
the parolee's thought in trying to ra-
tionalize his behavior may afford clues
to his mental and emotional make-up
which will be useful in effecting his fu-
ture adjustment in society.
"Third, the hearing is an opportunity
for the violator to discuss his behavior
and to have it analyzed by men who, by
virtue of the position they occupy, nec-
essarily have an interest in his future
behavior. If, through his own state-
ments, a parole violator can be made to
see how irrationally he has acted, and
how twisted his thinking has been; if,
as often is the case, he can be led to see
himself as ridiculous or foolish by his
own statements, a long step toward his
ultimate rehabilitation may have been
taken 3 9
In short, a chance to be heard before
revocation of a conditional release, is
from the standpoint of penal adminis-
tration, good. practice, and from the
standpoint of the prisoner, a constitu-
tional right.
ditional release without notice and hearing. It
is submitted that these cases reach a correct
result in holding that such revocation withou'
notice and hearing was invalid, although the-,
go further than necessary when they add that
a judicial hearing is required.
38 Escoe v. Zerbst, supra n. 31, at 493.
39 Attorney General's Survey of Release Pro-
cedures, VoL IV, "Parole," p. 246-7.
